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AFTERWORD
FREE THE FORTUNE 500!
THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SPEECH
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Rodney A. Smollat
INTRODUCTION
While the Supreme Court shirked the merits of the corporate
free speech debate in Nike v. Kasky' with the cryptic dispatch that
the petition for a writ of certiorari was "improvidently granted,"
the decision of those who organized this Symposium to proceed
with scholarly commentary on the case was not improvidently
made. One will find no shirkers here.
To the contrary, the assembled collection of articles is strik-
ing. From the compelling narrative of the case supplied to Ronald
Collins and David Skover2 to the thoughtful commentaries of
James Weinstein,3 Bruce Johnson and Jeffrey Fisher,4 Robert
O'Neil, 5 Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk,6 Deborah La Fe-
t Dean and Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of
Law.
I 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003).
2 Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case That
Wasn 't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1965 (2004).
3 James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formal-
ism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1091 (2004).
4 Bruce Johnson & Jeffrey Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, is the Key to Identifying
Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1243 (2004).
5 Robert O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have Been . 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV
1259 (2004).
6 Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fish, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not De-
cided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1143 (2004).
1277
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tra,7 Alan Morrison,8 C. Edwin Baker,9 and David Vladeck, 10 the
energy and insights generated are impressive.
For all the variety and disagreement present, two motifs con-
stantly reoccur. In assessing what to make of the corporate speech
issue in Nike, the commentators are all ineluctably drawn to as-
sessment of what to make more generally of commercial speech.
And in assessing what to make of commercial speech, the com-
mentators are ineluctably drawn to assessments of what to make
more generally of freedom of speech. To tug at the thread is to tug
at the sleeve; to tug at the sleeve is to tug at the coat.
I will not abuse the privilege of an Afterword to presume to
have the last word. My purpose here will not be to draw judg-
ments but to draw comparisons. And there are many to draw.
I. Is CORPORATE SPEECH DIFFERENT IN KIND
FROM OTHER PROTECTED SPEECH?
A. The Scienter Issue
The fault line of the doctrinal dispute posed by Nike v. Kasky
is fault itself. The First Amendment cannot be understood to give
Nike a right to utter false statements of fact with absolute impu-
nity. But is the converse true? Can the First Amendment be un-
derstood to give the government the right to impose penalties on
Nike under a standard of absolute liability?
False statements are not protected under the reigning com-
mercial speech standard established in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission." The Central Hud-
7 Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv 1205 (2004).
8 Alan Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist's Recol-
lections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv 1189 (2004).
9 C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech
Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv 1161 (2004).
10 David Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REv 1049 (2004).
11 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Public Service Commission of New York
ordered electric utilities to cease all advertising that "promotes the use of electricity." The Su-
preme Court held the restriction unconstitutional, and in the process of doing so announced what
is now a famous four-part test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 563-64. The Central Hudson standard, with some refinements, continues to be the con-
trolling First Amendment standard applicable to regulation of commercial speech. Under this
test, commercial speech receives significant shelter from excessive government regulation, but
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son test on the surface seems to simply disqualify false or mislead-
ing commercial speech from constitutional protection. The Cen-
tral Hudson test is mute as to whether a speaker must be at fault
for making the false statement before the speaker may be penal-
ized. The Central Hudson test also does not speak to such issues
as who has the burden of proving that an allegedly false or mis-
leading statement is in fact false or misleading, or the extent to
which false or misleading speech may include "soft" forms of "fal-
sity," including subjective characterizations, expressions of opin-
ion, or "puffery."
' 12
not protection as great as that provided to most other forms of non-commercial speech, such as
political speech. This understanding of Central Hudson was reinforced in Board of Trustees of
State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), in which the Supreme Court elabo-
rated on the meaning of the final prong of the Central Hudson test, requiring that the restrictions
on commercial speech be no more expansive than necessary to advance substantial governmen-
tal interests. The Court in Fox imported traditional economic cost/benefit balancing into com-
mercial speech jurisprudence, holding that under the reasonableness test the government must
affirmatively establish that it has "carefully calculated" the burdens imposed by its regulation
and that those burdens are justified in light of the weight of the government's objectives. Id. at
480. As the Court explained: "What our decisions require is a 'fit" between the legislature's
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."' Id. (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)). This "fit," the Court further
explained, need not be "necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served.. Id.
This notion of proportionality is now a vital element of commercial speech law.
12 Exaggerations and hyperbolic self-promotion of the kind common in advertising, often
called "puffery," is often dismissed as outside the ambit of "falsity" of the sort that constitutes
false advertising. It is a well-established defense to false-advertising claims that the exaggera-
tion, bluster, or boasting that is typical of much modern mass advertising simply does not con-
stitute actionable false advertising, because consumers are inured to such hyperbole, and no
reasonable consumer relies upon it. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:38 (4th ed. 1997) ("'Puffing' is exaggerated
advertising, blustering, and boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely."). As the
estimable Prosser and Keeton hornbook explains, in its typical common-sense, "puffing" is "a
seller's privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing specific, on the theory that no
reasonable man would believe him, or that no reasonable man would be influenced by such
talk." W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 757
(5th ed.1984). This is the standard understanding of false advertising, and under the First
Amendment, this is the law of the land. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater
Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir.1990) (defining "puffing" as "advertising that is not
deceptive for no one would rely on its exaggerated claims"); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir.1997) (defining "puffing" for Lanham Act purposes as
"exaggerated advertising, blustering, and boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely
and is not actionable under 43(a)"); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Puffing has been described by most courts as involving
outrageous generalized statements, not making specific claims, that are so exaggerated as to
preclude reliance by consumers."); United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th
Cir. 1998) ("Many claims will actually fall into a third category, generally known as 'puffery' or
'puffing.' Puffery is 'exaggerated advertising, blustering, and boasting upon which no reason-
able buyer would rely and is not actionable under § 43(a)."); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987
F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir.1993) (same). The notion of "puffery" is largely parallel to the fact vs.
opinion distinction and concepts of "rhetorical hyperbole" in defamation law. See also infra
note 18.
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In contrast the many unresolved issues surrounding false or
misleading speech under the Central Hudson standard, the First
Amendment principles applicable to defamation law relating to
falsity, defamatory meaning, and fault are highly developed.
Defamation law is a natural nominee for comparison, because
defamation is the principle vehicle traditionally used by the law to
remedy damage caused by false statements of fact that cause injury
to reputation. Under the standards emanating from New York
Times Company v. Sullivan 3 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,In
when the allegedly defamatory speech involves matters of public
concern, the First Amendment requires a private-figure plaintiff to
prove that the statement was made with at least ordinary negli-
gence as a precondition to liability, and requires that a public fig-
ure or public official plaintiff prove that the statement was made
with "actual malice," defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth or falsity.'5 The First Amendment places the
burden of proving falsity on plaintiffs,' 6 and provides at least some
constitutional protection for statements that are not "factual. 17
13 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
15 See generally RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, §§ 1:16-1:20, 2:1-2:19 (2004)
(reviewing applicable standards and collecting cases).
16 In defamation law, "ties" go to the speaker in cases in which the truth or falsity of a
statement cannot be determined. Under the holding of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767 (1986), a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before
there can be liability under state defamation law, and plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing
falsity. This First Amendment principle was adopted by the Supreme Court in Hepps for the
explicit purpose of tilting the balance in close cases toward freedom of speech, by ensuring that
in cases in which the evidence on the question of truth or falsity is in rough equipoise, the legal
system will err on the side of preserving free expression. Id. at 776 ("We believe that the com-
mon law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must
similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing
falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.").
17 Separating "fact" from "opinion," and determining the extent to which the First
Amendment ought to be understood as speaking to this issue, has been a vexing issue. The
question has had a roller-coaster history, for example, in First Amendment cases dealing with
defamation standards. The starting point for analysis is the holding of the United States Su-
preme Court in its landmark decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
Prior to Milkovich there was a spreading consensus among lower courts that the First Amend-
ment contained a free-standing constitutional protection for statements of opinion in defamation
actions. This constitutional protection of opinion was seen as superseding and augmenting the
protections embodied in the "fair comment" privilege recognized at common law. The basis of
this belief was traced most famously to language in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), in which the Supreme Court stated with seemingly emphatic certitude that "[u]nder the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the compe-
tition of other ideas." Id. at 339-40. Building on this pronouncement in Gertz, as well as other
statements from the Supreme Court protecting "rhetorical hyperbole," Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g
Assoc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), "lusty and imaginative expression of contempt," Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974).
or vicious parody, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), lower courts not only
treated opinion as independently protected by the First Amendment, but constructed various
[Vol. 54:4
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Corporate speech of the sort in contest in Nike, in which a ma-
jor corporation defends its labor practices in a foreign country, is
not traditional product advertising, yet it certainly is speech on
matters of "public concern.' ' 8 If we pigeonhole this type of corpo-
rate speech as a form of commercial speech, even though it is not
traditional product advertising, and if we simply assume that libel
law has nothing to do with the equation, either directly or by anal-
ogy, then received First Amendment doctrine would not appear to
require any demonstration of fault on the corporate speaker prior
to the imposition of some legal disability. At the very least, it
would be fair to say that the Central Hudson standard has yet to
evolve to a point that clearly decides these issues.19
In contrast, we might instead take the view that corporate
speech such as that at issue in Nike is not "commercial speech" at
all. We might reach this judgment using the technique suggested
by Bruce Johnson and Jeffrey Fisher, who argue that corporate ex-
pression conducted through the traditional channels of mass media
news and entertainment, as opposed to paid advertising, ought not
be treated as commercial speech.2 ° Or we might find persuasive
the clever historical point made by Robert O'Neil, who points out
multi-part doctrinal tests to define "opinion" generously. These judicial decisions tended to
emphasize such factors as (1) the author's choice of words; (2) whether the challenged state-
ment is capable of being objectively characterized as true or false; (3) the context of the chal-
lenged statement within the writing or speech as a whole; and (4) the broader social context into
which the statement fits. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich, how-
ever, complicated this picture. In Milkovich, the Court held that there is no free-standing First
Amendment privilege protecting "opinion" in defamation suits. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20.
Yet at the same time, the Supreme Court in Milkovich held that in defamation suits against
media defendants involving stories on issues on "matters of public concern," the First Amend-
ment requires that the defamatory statement, whether express or implied, be provable as false
before there can be liability. Id. at 20.
Is O'Neil, supra note 6, at 1260.
19 See Chemerinsky & Fish, supra note 7, at 1150-53.
20 Johnson & Fisher, supra note 5, at 1252-54. There is much to commend this view, for
channels of communication do seem to be part of our cultural lexicon and our approach to how
we understand and process expression in the mass media. Advertising is carried through adver-
tising channels, the argument goes, while news and comment are carried through the channels
and forums of news and entertainment media. Walk through Times Square in New York. Bril-
liant neon signs light the square with advertisements. These are punctuated by news scrawls
that continuously report the day's breaking news. Open a newspaper. There are stories carrying
information and ads carrying commercial messages. Turn on the television. News and enter-
tainment programming carry news and commentary. The commercials that punctuate the news
and entertainment broadcasts are clearly marked and plainly distinct. Our cultural and eco-
nomic conventions thus separate advertising channels and forums from news and commentary
forums and channels. As consumers we know when we are being sold a product or service
through a commercial pitch, and when we are being sold an idea or fact through an argumenta-
tive pitch. When Nike communicates in a commercial it communicates through a channel or
forum that everyone understands to be advertising. But when Nike communicates through the
channels of news or information, most people do not understand it to be advertising.
2004]
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that prior to the evolution of modern commercial speech doctrines,
corporate speech on issues relating to politics or social issues
would routinely have been understood as receiving the same high
levels of First Amendment protection as the same speech would
have received if uttered by other non-corporate speakers.2  And
even if the speech at issue in Nike is in part commercial speech,
we might be willing to treat it as a "hybrid," as Justice Breyer sug-
22gested in oral argument in the case, a form of speech in which
traditional commercial speech is blended with speech on matters of
public concern. This might lead us to decide that general First
Amendment principles ought to be imported into the governing
commercial speech standards, in whole or in part, such as the First
Amendment fault principles governing libel law. If such a move
were made we would engraft on false advertising or unfair trade
practice laws a fault standard (such as negligence or scienter) as a
precondition to liability.23
21 O'Neil, supra note 6, at 1260.
22 Tr. of Oral Argument at 58-59, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-
575), 2003 WL 21015068 ("I think it's both. You know, it's both. They're both trying to sell
their product and they're trying to make a statement that's relevant to a public debate.") (ques-
tion of Justice Breyer).
23 The intermingling of traditional product or service advertising with corporate speech on
broader social issues of public concern has posed difficult problems for courts before. Indeed,
distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech is itself not easy, as the Su-
preme Court has recognized, for often ostensibly commercial messages carry a political under-
current, and vice-versa. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n. 24 (1976). The point was well-illustrated in a colorful case arising in New
York out of the highly publicized dispute between Mayor Giuliani and New York Magazine.
N.Y. Magazine, a Div. of Primedia Magazines, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (2d
Cir. 1998). The New York Metropolitan Transit Authority removed from the sides of buses an
New York Magazine ad that contained the magazine's logo and read: "Possibly the only good
thing in New York Rudy hasn't taken credit for." Id. at 125. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit noted:
[T]his case aptly demonstrates that where there are both commercial and political
elements present in speech, even the determination whether speech is commercial or
not may be fraught with ambiguity and should not be vested in an agency such as
MTA. While the Advertisement served to promote the sales of a magazine, it just as
clearly criticized the most prominent member of the City's government on an issue
relevant to his performance of office, subtly calling into question whether the Mayor
is actually responsible for the successes of the City for which he claims credit.
Id. at 131. This decision was consistent with other judicial pronouncements involving situations
in which commercial and non-commercial speech elements are intertwined or indistinguishable,
in which courts tend to apply the higher levels of protection afforded non-commercial speech.
See Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 982 (9th Cir. 1998) (advertisement
for pro-life bumper sticker was not commercial speech because it did not express economic
interests; it sought to combine religious, political, and ideological concerns to purposefully blur
the distinction between commercial and non commercial speech), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131
(1999); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 247 (3d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999) (advertisements of pro-life group linking abortion
and breast cancer were not commercial speech even though the advertisement gave a number to
contact medical malpractice attorneys unaffiliated with the group); Commodity Trend Serv.,
Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (impersonal investment advice
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The choice here is not necessarily all or nothing. The First
Amendment could evolve, for example, to require fault before any
serious penalty may be imposed, but might permit a less punitive
remedy, such as a cease and desist order, merely on an adjudica-
tion of falsity. Even under some such compromise solution, how-
ever, we would need to resolve such questions as how to allocate
the burden of proof and how to apply the "puffery" concept or
"fact v. opinion" distinction.24 These are nuances, however, de-
tails that could be worked through without too much travail and
that are beyond the ambition of this essay. Far more important is
the core threshold question: Does the First Amendment require any
libel-style First Amendment doctrinal protections over and above a
naked finding of falsity?
Many thoughtful contributions contained in this Symposium
address this issue, from a wide variety of angles. I wish to focus
on three broad aspects of the debate: (1) arguments relating to con-
ceptions of human dignity; (2) arguments relating to claims that
commercial speech is uniquely "hardy" and "verifiable"; and (3)
arguments grounded in hierarchical conceptions of freedom of
speech, in which commercial speech is treated either as less impor-
tant than, or as inherently less trustworthy than, other forms of
protected speech.
B. Human Dignity Arguments
1. The Human Side of a Human Right
Conceptions of human dignity enter the corporate speech de-
bate from many directions. First Amendment theorists who be-
lieve that the principal purpose of the First Amendment is to ad-
vance human autonomy and dignity, may attempt to disqualify
corporate speech from protection on the simple and sufficient rea-
son that corporations have no human dignity to protect, because
they are inhuman.25 Several contributors conceptualize the First
Amendment in terms that emphasize the value of the Amendment
as an individual human right, with emphasis on the term human.
To the extent that the value of freedom of speech is articulated
principally in a vocabulary of realization of human dignity, there
will be little appropriate role for recognizing corporations as wor-
thy of First Amendment protection, as corporations are artificial
published by financial publisher is not commercial speech because the investment advice does
not propose a commercial transaction).
24 See supra notes 13, 16-18.
25 Baker, supra note 10, at 1163-64.
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legal constructs, not individual human beings with flesh, blood,
mind, or soul.
2 6
2. David and Goliath
A close cousin of the corporation-is-not-a-human argument is
the "little guy" argument. 27 Freedom of speech may be conceptu-
alized as grounded in notions of David and Goliath, a constitu-
tional guarantee aimed at protecting minority viewpoints against
the tyrannies of majorities, at facilitating dissent, and at empower-
ing the dispossessed to make their case against those in possession.
3. Libel and Individual Reputation
From a quite different direction, libel law has historically
been understood as grounded principally in the societal interest in
protecting human dignity by protecting reputation, and libel doc-
trines contain a number of defenses that especially protect indi-
viduals for statements made in self-defense or counteract in re-
sponse to reputational attacks.28 Again, corporations arguably
have little moral or policy claim to analogous legal protections, as
they have no human dignity to defend.
4. Libel and Corporations
Even so, there are no self-evident reasons why the basic First
Amendment principles governing modern defamation law could
not apply quite seamlessly to corporate speech. One may argue
that there are more connections between commercial speech doc-
trines and First Amendment libel principles than there are discon-
nections. The speech at issue in New York Times Company v. Sul-
livan itself was an advertisement on behalf of the Committee to
Defend Martin Luther King.29
It is true, of course, that defamation law is traditionally con-
cerned primarily with the protection of individual reputations. In
its modern defamation law decisions the Supreme Court has thus
spoken of the need to strike the appropriate balance between our
nation's robust commitment to freedom of speech and the vital
interests served by defamation law, which the Court has described
as reflecting "no more than our basic concept of the essential dig-
nity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any
26 Id.
27 See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 1077-78.
28 See SMOLLA, supra note 16, at § 1:25 (discussing role of protection of human dignity in
defamation law).
29 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257(1964).
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decent system of ordered liberty., 30  The dividing line established
in Gertz between public and private figures is an essential bulwark
in the preservation of this "essential dignity." At the heart of this
critical doctrinal dichotomy rests a corresponding set of mediating
moral and policy judgments, often described in the shorthand of
"assumption of risk" and "access to the channels of communica-
tion." The first judgment is grounded in notions of fairness and
assumption of risk: It is a fair "bargain" to impose on public fig-
ures additional exposure to risk of injury to reputation as part of
the price of voluntary entry into the public arena. A second judg-
ment is grounded in our profound national commitment to free
public discourse and robust debate: When persons enter an arena to
participate in public discourse and influence the outcome of a pub-
lic controversy, it is important that we provide "breathing space"
to all points of view in that debate, and in the service of that
breathing space we rely heavily on the marketplace of ideas, and
on the access of those individuals to channels of mass communica-
tion, to provide correctives and reputational self-defense. 31
Yet it is also true that defamation law has always, historically,
held its doors open to corporate plaintiffs. The one doctrinal ac-
commodation concerns the calculation of damages-as corpora-
tions cannot have hurt feelings or suffer emotional distress, corpo-
rate plaintiffs may not recover such subjective anguish-related
damages. With that one exception aside, however, courts for cen-
turies have allowed corporations to sue for defamation, and since
the decision in Gertz there have been hundreds of cases applying
the public figure/private figure dichotomy to corporations and cor-
porate leaders.32
30 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
31 Id. at 344.
32 In these cases there are often battles over whether the corporation should be deemed a
public figure or a private figure. At one extreme are the relatively easy cases in which a corpo-
ration has actively thrust itself into a pre-existing public controversy. In such cases the corpo-
rate plaintiff is easily and properly classifiable a public. Courts tend to struggle however, with
the much more common paradigm: the corporation that has been active as an advertiser of its
own products and services, but which has not in any other manner affirmatively thrust itself into
a pre-existing public controversy. A corporation does not become a public figure simply by
conducting its business in a routine way. There must be a pre-existing controversy, courts nor-
mally hold, and the corporation must "thrust itself' into it. See Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. v.
Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 952 (5th Cir. 1983). When a corporation has merely adver-
tised and conducted its business in a normal way, courts are often reluctant to saddle it with
public figure status even if it is nationally known and relatively large. In Snead v. Redland
Aggregates, Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 1050 (1994), a case
in which a claim was brought by the president and chairman of a railroad company against two
corporations, and the corporations brought counterclaims for libel, the court analyzed the ques-
tion of whether, in this business context, the plaintiffs were public or private figures and deter-
mined that they should properly be classified as private. The court's opinion began by observ-
2004l
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5. Human Dignity, Speaker-Based Discrimination, and Speech of
"Public Concern"
On one level or another much of the commentary on corporate
speech divides on the threshold question of whether attention
should focus principally on the identity of the speaker or the con-
tent of the speech. Edwin Baker so frames the issue,33 concluding
that "reflection and example show commercial is crucially about
the identity of the speaker. 34 A focus on the speaker favors the
state (which is seeking to regulate corporate speech), while a focus
on the speech tends to favor the corporation (which by definition
seeks to free corporate speech).
Large parts of modern First Amendment law are tied explic-
itly to the notion that the First Amendment is concerned princi-
pally, if not entirely, on the protection of speech on "matters of
public concern." Defamation law-a body of legal doctrine that is
especially germane because it is the body of law most classically
dedicated to separation of truth of falsity-is a body of law in
which heightened First Amendment standards kick in only when
35the speech first qualifies as speech on matters of public concern.
ing that the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz was grounded in two policy justifications for
differentiating between public and private figures. "First, public figures 'enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic op-
portunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private indi-
viduals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is corre-
spondingly greater."' Id. at 1329 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344). Second, the Fifth Circuit
observed, "public figures 'invite attention and comment,"' assuming the risk of greater scrutiny
of their affairs, as part of the cost of entering the public arena. Id. at 1329 (quoting Gertz, 418
U.S. at 344-45). Applying these policy justifications to the context of businesses and profes-
sionals requires a case-by-case assessment of the extent to which they are implicated by the
particular factual circumstances giving rise to the allegedly defamatory speech. Id. at 1329
("[T]he inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis, examining all the relevant facts and
circumstances."). Those in business and businesses themselves do not necessarily have greater
access to the channels of effective communication than do other individuals. "Some corpora-
tions, such as media corporations or large conglomerates, obviously have such access, but the
bulk of corporations do not." Id. The same is true of the "assumption of risk" rationale. "Al-
though some corporations voluntarily thrust themselves into the public eye, the majority of
corporations do not." Id. The Court in Snead articulated several factors that deserve considera-
tion in making the public figure / private figure assessment. "First, the notoriety of the corpora-
tion to the average individual in the relevant geographical area is relevant. Notoriety will be
affected by many factors, such as the size and nationality of the corporation." Id. Second, the
Court instructed, the "nature of the corporation's business must be considered." Id. And third,
the Court stated that "courts should consider the frequency and intensity of media scrutiny that a
corporation normally receives. For example, even a small corporation that does not deal with
consumers might attain notoriety if it engages in frequent corporate takeovers that become
widely publicized." Id. Applying these factors, the Court in Snead held that the business plain-
tiffs before it were not public figures. Id. at 1329-30.
33 Baker, supra note 10, at 1163-64.
34 Id.
35 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (raising
the possibility that common-law strict liability standards for defamation may be constitutionally
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Other bodies of First Amendment doctrine similarly treat the "mat-
ters of public concern" construct as a threshold gatekeeper. In
cases in which public employees claim that they have been inap-
propriately dismissed or disciplined in retaliation for the exercise
of free speech rights, for example, courts must initially ask
whether the employee's speech was on a "matter of public con-
cern." 36 If this question is answered affirmatively, the employee
has a foot in the door; the court will then proceed to apply a bal-
ancing test, in which the interest of the employee to speak is bal-
anced against the interest of the government as employer in pro-
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs.
37
In the context of corporate speech, the "matters of public con-
cern" standard will tend to work to the benefit of corporations.
While one may impugn the motive of corporate commentary on
matters of public concern, it is much harder to morph the content
of such commentary itself. Imagine, for example, that a tobacco
company launches a dignified public service advertising campaign
commemorating the Bill of Rights. The ads, devoid of any overt
commercial content whatsoever, tout the value of freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, or due process of law. At the ends of
the ad spots the corporate sponsors name is briefly flashed on the
television screen. It would be difficult to argue that the content of
a commercial advancing the cause of freedom of speech is any-
thing other than content on a matter of public concern. Yet there
are many who would view such advertising with heavy cynicism,
on the assumption that the corporate motivation has nothing to do
with any authentic altruistic reverence for civil liberties, but rather
is entirely the stuff of a crasser materialistic push for a libertarian-
ism that is suspicious of all governmental regulation, including
regulation of smoking.
A statement made by a journalist writing for the Wall Street
Journal or a citizen on her own web page defending Nike's em-
permissible when the attempt to impose liability does not involve any issue of "public con-
cern"). There is authority for the proposition that the First Amendment might permit strict
liability standards to apply in defamation actions not involving public figure plaintiffs or issues
of public concern. See Sleem v. Yale Univ., 843 F.Supp. 57, 62 (M.D. N.C. 1993); Pearce v.
E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F.Supp. 1490, 1505 n. 21 (D.D.C. 1987); Ross v. Bricker, 770
F.Supp. 1038, 1043 (D.V.I. 1991); SMOLLA, supra note 16, at § 3:17 (2004); see also Mutafis v.
Erie Insurance Exchange, 775 F.2d 593, 594-95 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that under Dun &
Bradstreet no First Amendment principles attached to speech arising from an inter-office
memorandum not on issues of public concern); Snead, 998 F.2d at 1333 (holding that Dun &
Bradstreet exempts states from First Amendment strictures in defamation actions when speech
not on matters of public concern).
36 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Coninck v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
37 Coninck, 461 U.S. 138; Waters, 511 U.S. 661.
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ployment practices in the third world would enjoy the full-blown
protection of modern First Amendment law. The notion that the
government could impose a strict liability penalty on the Wall
Street Journal or the citizen-commentator for falsehoods on the
theory that the Journal or the citizen had committed an offense
against the polity by injecting bad information into the market-
place would manifestly run afoul of modern First Amendment
principles.38 By the same token, the idea that the government
could impose a strict liability penalty on a journalist or citizen for
false statements critical of Nike for its third-world employment
practices would similarly offend the Constitution. Thus the ques-
tion is cleanly posed. If we posit for the sake of pristine example
that the speech in contest is identical, may a different First Amend-
ment standard be applied merely because the identity of the
speaker changes?
One of the principal attacks on the liability rules imposed by
California law is grounded in the claim that the First Amendment
ought not countenance asymmetry in the legal standards applicable
the statements made by those who attack Nike and the statements
made by Nike in its own defense. Activists who criticize a major
international corporation such as Nike are subject to liability for
defamation only on proof that the corporation was defamed by a
false statement of fact which was published with "actual malice"-
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity. If
Nike in defending itself is subject to liability on some lesser show-
ing of fault-strict liability or negligence-there is a tilt to the
playing field that arguably skews the free flow of information in
the marketplace in a manner that offends core First Amendment
values. As the Supreme Court once put the matter (outside the
context of commercial speech), it might be argued that the gov-
ernment "has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules. 39
Asymmetry, however, is no bother when it is perceived as a
corrective. When David is fighting Goliath, some may not be es-
pecially offended when, while the ref happens to be looking the
other way, David slips a low blow. Nike is an international corpo-
rate giant with enormous market influence, a high-powered public
relations machine, and an behemoth budget for advertising buys.
It is not exactly as if Nike lacks the capacity to get its message
across. And in the eyes of many, that message is constantly ma-
38 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
39 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
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nipulative, pulling out all the stops of sophisticated public rela-
tions and image advertising to seduce consumers and assuage ma-
terialist guilt. A little asymmetry in the legal liability standards
does not exactly pull at the heartstrings. An activist dares pull on
our moral conscience by lobbing a few caustic attacks on Nike. So
what if he gets a bit of a legal break when the slings and arrows of
litigious fortune commence to fly?
If the argument is that corporate speech is somehow different
in kind from other speech protected by the First Amendment, the
question is how is it different in kind? Reliance on the mere fact
that a corporation as a "person" is a legal fiction is not persuasive,
for there are many non-profit corporations and other forms of col-
lective organization engaged in expressive activity that has always
been understood to enjoy full First Amendment protection. The
fact is that much of the speech that rests at the core of our First
Amendment tradition is not speech by individuals, but speech by
organizations, including corporate organizations, that may be non-
profits but still operate in a collective manner. Political parties,
public interest groups, art organizations such as theaters, muse-
ums, or symphonies, religious entities, labor unions, and private
universities are among the myriad examples of entities that are
"incorporated," that often have boards of trustees, chief execu-
tives, and staffs organized in hierarchical systems similar to a
profit-making corporation, and that engage in a wide variety of
expressive activity. When these entities engage in expression, the
collective entity itself speaks through its employees or agents
(such as a public relations firm or advertising agency), not any one
human being.
If the argument is that corporate speech cannot plausibly rest
in the collective nature, rather than individual human nature, of the
speaker, then perhaps it is the profit motive that matters. Yet this
is similarly unconvincing. For again, the notion that speech is not
stripped of its protection under the First Amendment merely be-
cause it is carried on for pecuniary gain is well-entrenched in First
Amendment doctrine and well-defensible in First Amendment the-
ory.40 The difficulties multiply when one considers the fact that
advertising is often conducted by individuals. A business may be a
sole proprietorship (as in the case of a lawyer who is a sole practi-
tioner), or a business, although incorporated and large, may be so
wrapped up in the individual persona of one high-visibility person
(Martha Stewart, for example) that the individual's personal ex-
pression is inextricably intertwined with the expression of the cor-
40 See, e.g, First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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porate business. Alan Morrison's essay here is illuminating, re-
minding us of the seminal connections between the evolution of
commercial speech protection and lawyer advertising.4'
C. Hardiness and Verifiability Arguments
The diminished protection granted to commercial speech is
historically justified by the unique "hardiness" and "verifiability"
of statements made in commercial advertising.42 A still unresolved
tension in commercial speech doctrine turns on the extent to which
commercial speech may be treated differently from other protected
speech on the theory that it needs less help to survive. The classic
argument is that it is both uniquely hardy and uniquely verifiable,
and thus may be left more to fend for itself.43 There is an arguable
element of question-begging to this point, however, for advertisers
might just as plausibly assert that commercial speech is only as
hardy as the law empowers it to be, and that if certain advertising
practices are prohibited by law and the sanctions sufficiently en-
forceable, no degree of perceived hardiness will enable the speech
to persevere.
In this vein, it is worth considering whether the "chilling ef-
fect" argument, so powerful in many First Amendment contexts,
and especially prominent in defamation cases, 44 applies any more
41 See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1196-97. Do lawyers who advertise have the same First
Amendment rights as those who advertise other goods and services? In doctrinal terms, this
conflict might be distilled in the question: "Is lawyer advertising a separate and self-contained
subset of commercial speech law, providing lawyers with less protection than other advertis-
ers?" The sheer fact that the Supreme Court has decided so many lawyer advertising cases has
had some tendency to lead us to think of lawyer advertising jurisprudence as a discrete body of
law. As Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner explained:
Lawyer advertising, initially an area covered by mainstream commercial speech ju-
risprudence, became the subject of so many cases that it developed into its own dis-
tinct area of common law. The first few cases, such as Bates in 1977 and Primus
and Ohralik the following year, drew on the more general commercial speech doc-
trine to formulate rules regarding client solicitation. But, by the time we got to
R.M.J. in 1982, Zauderer in 1985, and Shapero in 1988, that practice stopped. In its
place the Court relied on the precedent of the previous decade. At present, the law
of attorney advertising has grown to such an extent that it has been able to seal itself
off from its roots in first amendment theory; in a field of common law that is only
thirteen years old, judges often decide these cases with reference only to prior case
law.
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 630
(1990). While constitutional protection for commercial speech has steadily expanded over the
course of the last decade, there appears to be a residual bias against lawyer advertising that
continues to exert some influence on regulatory policy. Lawyer advertising at times appears to
be regarded as a "second class" commercial speech citizen, not entitled to full participation in
the free speech privileges and immunities other advertisers enjoy.
42 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; see also Baker, supra note 10, at 1167.
43 See Baker, supra note 10, at 1167. For a critique of this position, see Kozinski & Ban-
ner, supra note 42, at 634-38.
44 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
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or less cogently to advertising than to other forms of speech. Let
us first flip the traditional argument. There are many sound rea-
sons justifying New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny,
but one of the central animating assumptions underlying New York
Times is that the scienter requirement (actual malice) created by
the case is necessary to avoid the chilling effect of strict liability
or negligence as the operative fault rule.45 This is an article of
faith in modern First Amendment doctrine. Like many articles of
faith, however, it has always been more a matter of normative
judgement than scientific demonstration. Would our robust and
argumentative culture of news, information, and entertainment be
less vigorous in the absence of the actual malice standard?
Try this thought experiment. Imagine that the Supreme Court
in, say Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,46 had held that, upon reconsid-
eration of the question, the ruling in New York Times was simply
overkill, and that ordinary negligence ought to be the governing
First Amendment principle in all defamation cases involving is-
sues of public concern, whether the plaintiff is a private figure or a
public one. Or more radically, imagine that the Supreme Court
held that the whole doctrinal course launched in New York Times
was a mistake, and common-law rules (including strict liability)
ought again be permitted to operate. If the Supreme Court rolled-
back the law, how different would American culture be? There is
no empirical data to guide us, but it is at least plausible that the
most honest answer is, "not much." Would a different ruling in
Gertz have caused the Internet to evolve in a manner less wide-
open? Would a different ruling in Gertz have altered the combus-
tible tenor of CNN's Crossfire, the outrageous-push-the-envelope
irreverence of radio shock jocks, the over-the-top-anti-liberal
bombasts of the radio right, or the daily stuff of Fox News, ESPN,
MSNBC, MTV, HBO-of any of the whole booming buzzing
modern mass confusion of modern mass media? England has not
adopted New York Times v. Sullivan as the rule of decision for
British libel law.47 Walk down the streets of London and take a
look at what appears in British tabloids, or turn on British televi-
sion, and ask whether the absence of the actual malice standard in
the United Kingdom has made English mass culture excessively
shy.
The point being made here is that the traditional claim that
commercial speech is somehow uniquely hardy is far from self-
45 See SMOLLA, supra note 16, at § 2:3.
- 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
47 See SMOLLA, supra note 16, at § 1:9.
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
evident. And its uniqueness is far from self-evident in either di-
rection. The speech that appears on The Sopranos or Sex in the
City is plenty hardy. The profit motive that is often cited as the
source of the hardiness of advertising also powers HBO,
AOL/Time Warner, the New York Times Company, Universal
City Studios, and Disney/ABC. This leads to the third style of ar-
gument, hierarchical claims that simply place commercial speech
low in the rankings of what deserves constitutional protection.
D. Hierarchical Arguments
To the extent that diminished protection for commercial
speech is justified on hardiness grounds, one may be suspicious
that this is but a camouflage for a deeper judgment that is in fact
moving things-a judgment that in some gestalt sense commercial
speech is either not as valuable or not as trustworthy as other
forms of expression. This bias against commercial speech is worth
examining against the foil of the broad arc of modern commercial
speech cases, against the growing hostility toward paternalism in
commercial speech regulation, and against the paradigm shift in
commercial speech cases from consumer-protection rationales to
speaker-protection rationales.
1. The Arc of Commercial Speech Protection
At least as a descriptive matter, the hierarchical arguments
made to justify low levels of protection for commercial speech run
against the tide of modern commercial speech decisions. While
nominally the Supreme Court continues to apply the intermediate
scrutiny standard of Central Hudson, examination of the actual
case decisions demonstrates that the trajectory of modern commer-
cial speech law has been an accelerating rise of protection for ad-
vertising. David Vladeck's statistical compendium is quite tell-
ing.48 The sheer number of Supreme Court commercial speech
cases is impressive-at least twenty-four since Virginia Pharmacy,
a level of activity difficulty to match in any other narrow field of
constitutional law. The arc of the cases is unmistakable: in deci-
sion after decision the Supreme Court has advanced protection for
advertising, repeatedly striking down regulations grounded in pa-
ternalistic motivations or speculative judgments by government
regulators. 49 This is not to say that there have not been "blips" in
48 Vladeck, supra note 11, at 1067-68.
49 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (striking down restric-
tions on pharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
(striking down some and sustaining some restrictions on tobacco advertising); Greater New
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this progression, cases in which the Court has sustained regulation
of advertising. 50  Yet the win-loss record for commercial speech
remains striking--of the two-dozen cases, the Court has ruled
against commercial speech only five times, and not all of those
defeats would stand up to present doctrine. 51 The cases sustaining
restrictions on commercial speech pale, however, in number and in
force, when compared to the overwhelming body of precedent
striking restrictions down.5 2
One of the most important themes in this movement has been
the notion that government may not "pick on" commercial speech
just because it is commercial speech. If the government chooses to
regulate commercial speech less favorably than non-commercial
Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (striking down casino gam-
bling advertising limitations); 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (strik-
ing down liquor advertisement restrictions); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)
(striking down beer advertising regulations); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. and Prof's Regulation,
512 U.S. 136, 147 (1994) (striking down restrictions on accountancy advertising); Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (striking down commercial speech limitations on accountants); Cin-
cinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking down restrictions on news-
racks for commercial flyers and publications); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n of II1., 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (regulation banning lawyer advertisement of certification by
the National Board of Trial Advocacy as misleading unconstitutional); Shapero v. Ky. Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (regulation banning solicitation for legal business mailed on a per-
sonalized or targeted basis to prevent potential clients from feeling undue duress to hire the
attorney unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down some and upholding some restrictions on lawyer advertis-
ing); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (statute banning unsolicited mail-
ings advertising contraceptives to aid parental authority over teaching their children about birth
control unconstitutional); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (regulations limiting the precise
names of practice areas lawyers can use in ads and identifying the jurisdictions lawyer is li-
censed in as misleadingly unconstitutional); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down restrictions on advertising statements by public
utilities); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (striking down restrictions on solicitation of legal
business on behalf of ACLU); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (regulation banning
lawyer advertisement of prices for routine legal services as misleadingly unconstitutional);
Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); (regulation banning
placement of "for sale" signs in the front lawns of houses in order to prevent the town from
losing its integrated racial status unconstitutional); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down restrictions on pharmaceutical
advertising); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (striking down restrictions on abortion
advertising).
50 See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (sustaining thirty-day ban on di-
rect mail solicitation by lawyers to accident victims or families); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Assoc., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (sustaining bar restrictions on in-person solicitation); United States
v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (sustaining restrictions on broadcasting of lotteries in
states that do not permit lotteries); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (sustaining state
university restriction on "Tupperware parties.").
51 Vladeck, supra note 11, at 1067-68.
52 It is especially significant that the one commercial speech decision widely regarded as
the most hostile to protection of advertising, Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), a case sustaining restrictions on casino advertis-
ing in Puerto Rico, was entirely discredited and effectively overruled in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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speech, it must justify that discrimination for reasons relating to
the commercial character of the speech. This principle is now
well-entrenched in First Amendment law, and has been forcibly
stated by the Supreme Court even when applying the standards of
Central Hudson. A leading example is Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc. ,5 in which the Court struck down a law that treated
commercial magazine and newspaper kiosks and news racks less
favorably than similar facilities used to sell traditional newspa-
pers.54 This rationale of Discovery Network partakes of a more
ubiquitous First Amendment principle: Government may not im-
pose penalties on a class of speech by category when the interest it
seeks to advance are not related in any way to the attributes of the
speech within that category. First Amendment law treats such
"disconnects" with great suspicion.
55
2. Paternalism
Hierarchical arguments are difficult to emancipate from pa-
ternalism. The Supreme Court's war on paternalism in the regula-
tion of advertising has been consistent and unremitting. In Thomp-
son v. Western States Medical Center,56 for example, the Court
reiterated a theme that has been prominent in the Court's deci-
sional law for decades, observing that
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information
is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
53 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
54 As the Supreme Court explained in Discovery Network:
The major premise supporting the city's argument is the proposition that commercial
speech has only a low value.... In our view, the city's argument attaches more im-
portance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our
cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech .... Not
only does Cincinnati's categorical ban ... place too much importance on the dis-
tinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the dis-
tinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has
asserted. It is therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city's admit-
tedly legitimate interests.
Id. at 419-24 (internal citations omitted).
51 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991) (striking down New York's "Son of Sam" law because the income derived
from a criminal's descriptions of his crime and other sources "has nothing to do with" New
York's interest in transferring proceeds of crime from criminals to victims); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (holding that state's interest in residential privacy cannot sustain
statute permitting labor picketing, but prohibiting nonlabor picketing, when "nothing in the
content-based labor-nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy").
56 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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the best means to that end is to open the channels of commu-
nication rather than to close them.
57
Justices from both the liberal and conservative wings of the
Court have expressed a strong antipathy for any government
regulation of advertising smacking of paternalism.
58
3. Paradigm Shifts from Consumer Protection to Speaker Protection
The arguments against corporate speech are also in tension
with the fundamental paradigm shift that has taken place in com-
mercial speech law, in which the focus has moved from consumer
57 Id. at 375 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 770 (1976); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503
(1996) ("[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech ... usually rest solely on
the offensive assumption that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth. The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.") (citation omitted); id. at 508
("Such speculation certainly does not suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial
information for paternalistic ends."); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of
I1l., 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990) ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of peti-
tioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television."); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 & n.31 (1978) (criticizing State's pater-
nalistic interest in protecting the political process by restricting speech by corporations); Un-
mark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97(1977) (criticizing, in the commercial speech
context, the State's paternalistic interest in maintaining the quality of neighborhoods by restrict-
ing speech to residents).
58 As Justice Stevens stated in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, 514 U.S. 476 (1995):
Any "interest" in restricting the flow of accurate information because of the per-
ceived danger of that knowledge is anathema to the First Amendment; more speech
and a better informed citizenry are among the central goals of the Free Speech
Clause. Accordingly, the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state interests
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government believes to be their
own good.
Id. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring). And in the words of Justice Thomas:
In case after case following Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court, and individual
Members of the Court, have continued to stress the importance of free dissemination
of information about commercial choices in a market economy; the antipaternalistic
premises of the First Amendment; the impropriety of manipulating consumer
choices or public opinion through the suppression of accurate "commercial" infor-
mation; the near impossibility of severing "commercial" speech from speech neces-
sary to democratic decisionmaking; and the dangers of permitting the government to
do covertly what it might not have been able to muster the political support to do
openly.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also id. at 495-96 ("[A] State's paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, non-
misleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it."); Va. Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) ("But the choice
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It
is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers
of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."); Riley v. Nat'l
Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1988) ("The State's remaining justifica-
tion-the paternalistic premise that charities' speech must be regulated for their own benefit-is
equally unsound. The First Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the gov-
ernment, know best both what they want to say and how to say it.").
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protection to speaker protection. Commercial speech doctrine in
its early years often justified the extension of First Amendment
protection for advertising by emphasizing the rights of consumers
within the free enterprise system, an argument that was also often
couched in terms of the broad interest of society in protecting the
free flow of information. While the argument contained much of
the rhetoric of open markets and the value of the free enterprise
system, this rhetoric was wrapped up in notions of informed con-
sumer choice and social utility. The case was not speaker-based
but recipient-based. Thus, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,59 the Court stated:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise econ-
omy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggre-
gate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable. 60
The Court also observed that for many individuals, and indeed
for society generally, commercial speech is often every bit as im-
portant as speech on such issues as politics, religion, science, or
the arts: "As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow
of commercial information," the Court in Virginia Pharmacy thus
noted, "that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate.",61 This individ-
ual interest in turn translated into a broader societal interest in pro-
tecting the robust flow of commercial information in our wide-
open and vigorous economy. Some may love advertising, finding
that it spices and enriches life; others may seek to avoid it. But it
is a vital part of our national life, and a vital part of the speech
protected by the Constitution. In the words of the Court in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy:
Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the
free flow of commercial information. Even an individual ad-
vertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general
public interest.... Advertising, however tasteless and exces-
sive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of
59 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
60 Id. at 765.
61 1d. at 763.
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information as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price.
Especially in the 1990s, however, the emphasis seemed to
change, with greater attention paid to the rights of the commercial
speaker.63 The shift in justification from consumer to speaker
naturally worked to the benefit of advertisers. When the con-
sumer's interests are paramount, the argument for paternalistic
protection of consumers will be at its most resonate. When the
speaker's rights are paramount, the argument against paternalism
will gain traction. And indeed, this is precisely what has hap-
pened. As paternalism has become increasingly discredited, the
intermediate scrutiny standard of Central Hudson has come under
escalating pressure. As David Vladeck notes,64 many Supreme
Court Justices, and many legal commentators, began to call for the
complete abandonment of Central Hudson, arguing that commer-
cial speech should be elevated to the same levels of protection ap-
plicable to other forms of speech in society, such as political, reli-
gious, scientific, or artistic expression.65 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island,66 the shift in focus reached genuine maturity. In 44
Liquormart rhetoric was not about consumers but about advertisers
and their role in culture:
Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our his-
tory. Even in colonial days, the public relied on "commercial
speech" for vital information about the market. Early news-
papers displayed advertisements for goods and services on
their front pages, and town criers called out prices in public
squares. Indeed, commercial messages played such a central
role in public life prior to the Founding that Benjamin Frank-
lin authored his early defense of a free press in support of his
decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages
to Barbados.67
The opinions of several Justices in 44 Liquormart seemed to
signal the possibility that the Court was willing to expand even
62 Id.
63 Vladeck, supra note 11, at 1070.
' Id. at 3.
65 At various times as many as four different Justices have expressed doubts about adher-
ing to Central Hudson. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501, 510-514 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy,
and Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at
518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
- 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
67 Id. at 495.
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more the already substantial First Amendment protection granted
to commercial speech. That possibility was raised again in a 1999
decision, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United
States,68 in which the Court observed that "certain judges, scholars,
and amici curiae have advocated repudiation of the Central Hud-
son standard and implementation of a more straightforward and
stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions
on commercial speech., 69  The Court did not take up this invita-
tion. But the fact that it keeps talking this talk must mean that it is
feeling tempted to walk the walk.
Thus, while the Court continues to apply Central Hudson, it
does so against the backdrop of growing momentum for doctrinal
change that would provide even greater protection for advertis-
ing.7° At a time in American life in which a revival of entrepre-
neurial enterprise is a core national concern, the argument goes,
the nation ought not treat commercial speech as beneath the dig-
nity of the First Amendment.7'
CONCLUSION
Robert O'Neil offers the brilliant insight that, contrary to our
surface intuitions, corporate speech of the sort at issue in Nike
would, in all probability, have enjoyed more constitutional protec-
6 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
69 Id.
70 This was the approach taken in the Court's most recent commercial speech case,
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 1505 (2002) ("Although several
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it
should apply in particular cases, there is no need in this case to break new ground. 'Central
Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for
decision."' (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-555 (2001))); see Linda
Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Challenge to Cigarette Ad Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, January 9,
2001, at A16 ("The court has grown increasingly protective of commercial speech in the past 20
years, and in recent cases most of the current justices have indicated in one way or another that
the Central Hudson test is inadequate.").
71 See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 42 (arguing for strong commercial speech protec-
tion); Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46
BROOK. L. REV. 437, 448-53 (1980) (arguing that commercial speech deserves greater protec-
tion than it currently receives to ensure that data necessary for economic and political decision-
making is available); Martin Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commer-
cial Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553 (1997);
Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Val-
ues of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 431 (1971) (arguing that certain commer-
cial speech should receive heightened protection); Martin Redish & Howard M. Wasserman,
What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235 (1998); Jeffrey Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-Danger
Test: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1977)
(arguing in favor of treating all speech as protected under rigorous heightened review standards,
without regard to categories such as "commercial speech" or "libel"); Rodney A. Smolla, Infor-
mation, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 777 (1993) (arguing for strong commercial speech protection).
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tion prior to the creation of modern commercial speech doctrines
in the mid 1970s, because we would not have thought to treat it
differently from other kinds of speech on political or social is-
sues. 72 The Supreme Court may have momentarily tabled resolu-
tion of the issues posed by Nike, but the Court will inevitably face
them again. When it does, a key atmospheric will involve notions
of constitutional interpretation and process, notions that might be
reduced to the simple question: Who has the burden of persuasion?
If one starts from the perspective that commercial speech has
no entitlement to First Amendment shelter at all, and is lucky to
get what crumbs it can, one might well be inclined to say that Cen-
tral Hudson is all that commercial speakers need, and they ought
not look a gift horse in the mouth. If the burden is placed on cor-
porate speakers to demonstrate why they deserve high levels of
protection for false speech, they will start the case having to come
from behind. And if the corporate advocate happens to be another
multi-million dollar international conglomerate such as Nike, it
would be hard to gin up many sympathy votes.
If instead the argument is framed from the beginning on the
assumption that corporate speech on matters of public concern is,
after all, speech on public concern, and thus presumptively entitled
to full First Amendment protection, then the burden of proof is on
the government as to why such speech should be disqualified from
otherwise applicable First Amendment shelter. It would then be
the government that begins the case from behind, and the govern-
ment that would have to demonstrate how commercial speech is
substantially different in kind from other forms of protected ex-
pression.
When these debates again resurface, the fine efforts of the
lawyers and scholars who contributed to this symposium will cer-
tainly enrich the quality of the deliberative process.
72 O'Neil, supra note 6, at 1260.
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